Ex
Parte Crouse (1839) is a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision which
establishes the doctrine of parens
patriae, “the state is the father.” Parens
patriae grants the state the right to intervene with parenting to protect a
child or individual. The dispute began when Mary Crouse, a fifteen-year-old
“infant” is committed to the House of Refuge without a trial. Crouse’s father
sues the House of Refuge for the release of Mary based on habeas corpus, “show me the body.” Although Ex Parte Crouse
empowered judges and the courts to impose progressive era goals, in practice
the case disempowered children and delegitimized “other” families.
Mary’s mother placed her into the
House of Refuge due to her vitriolic, uncontrollable actions. Based on Mary’s
age, government officials did not allow Mary to present herself in court.
Mary’s father argued this violated her right of habeas corpus, in which the
Pennsylvania court cannot lock an individual in prison without appearing before
a judge to hear charges. Furthermore he argues that despite how badly children
behaved, they could not be taken from their parents. The court ruled that the
judicial system has the right to assist families unable to control, educate, or
protect the virtue of troubled youth. When parents fail to exercise parental
control, it becomes the state’s responsibility to reform wayward children.
This case exemplifies the
Progressive Era’s paternal compulsion. Although the organization of the House
of Refuge fell below expectations, the reformers of the Progressive Era
grappled with intense anxiety about urbanization, immigration, class, and
industrialization. The fear of raising inept children became a growing concern
for middle-class child-savers. Parens
patriae served as a vehicle for these reformers to delegitimize “other” parents
by favoring paternalism. Parens patriae
served as a policing mechanism in which children are sent to state-sponsored
reforming institutions to strip “other” parents of control. Despite Mary’s
father wanting custody of his child, the court deprived him of authority and
forced Mary to be dependent upon the government. This leads me to question the
standards upon which the exercise of parental control are based on. If mother
and father disagree on whether the child’s acts are harmful, but one parent is
willing to claim responsibility for those actions, I am unsure it is the
government’s role to intercede by transferring parental rights to a judge. The
court’s approach of dismantling families based on
subjective standards is unsettling.
The court’s decision that Mary’s
internment at the House of Refuge was not punishment, but rehabilitation,
ignores her constitutionals rights. I am unconvinced the House of Refuge acted
as a refuge-school for at-risk youth. Parens
patriae takes a dangerous diversion towards subjectivity and away from
constitutional doctrine by enhancing the power of judges to pronounce the best
interests of youth. This further denies youth agency and establishes the power
of juvenile justice courts.
